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BOOK REVIEW:
THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY:
FROM FDR'S VISION TO BUSH'S GAMBLE,
NANCY J. ALTMAN (HOBOKEN: JOHN
WILEY & SONS, INC., 2005, 362 PP.
$24.95 (U.S.), CLOTH)
KATHRYN L.

MOORE"

As Richard Kaplan has noted, "During the past decade, few
issues have caused more ink to spill or more trees to fall than
Social Security."' At the risk of spilling yet more ink on this
subject, I am writing this review to bring attention to a recent and
valuable addition to the debate on Social Security reform: The
Battle for Social Security: From FDR's Vision to Bush's Gamble, by
Nancy J. Altman.
Running over three hundred pages, Altman's book is
ambitious. It is part history, part critique of President Bush's
proposal to fundamentally restructure the current Social Security
system by introducing personal retirement accounts,3 and part
reform proposal.4 Overall, it succeeds on all accounts.
Altman's success should come as no surprise.
She is
eminently qualified to write such a book. Graduating from the
University of Pennsylvania Law School the year ERISA was
enacted, Altman was assistant to Alan Greenspan when he served
as Chairman of the bipartisan National Commission on Social
Security Reform from 1981 to 1983. In addition, among other
things, she is a founding member of the National Academy of
Social Insurance and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Pension Rights Center.

Everett H. Metcalf, Jr., Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky
College of Law.
1. Richard L. Kaplan, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 297, 297 (2006)
(reviewing JOHN TURNER, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. DEBATE (2006)).
2. See NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR'S
VISION TO BUSH'S GAMBLE 9-253 (2005).
3. See id. at 255-96.
4. See id. at 297-309.
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At the outset, it is important to note that this book is not an
objective critique of the strengths and weaknesses of the current
Social Security system. Altman is a passionate supporter of the
current system and a harsh critic of proposals, like President
Bush's proposal, to fundamentally restructure the current system
by adding individual accounts. Readers looking for an objective
critique of the current system or a defense of individual account
proposals would do well to look elsewhere.5 On the other hand,
readers interested in a heartfelt defense of the current system, a
detailed and lively account of the history of the system, a reform
proposal that addresses Social Security's long-term deficit without
fundamentally changing the system, and many unique and
interesting insights will find this book well worth reading.
Altman's book begins by emphasizing an often forgotten fact:
Social Security is much more than just a retirement program. It
also provides survivor and disability benefits.6 Indeed, according
to Altman:
In the chaotic aftermath of [September 11, 2001,] millions of
Americans reached into their pockets to contribute to the Red
Cross and other charitable organizations assisting the families of
the 9/11 victims.
But the most immediate, sustained, and
generous support for those families came from Social Security.7
Much of the book is devoted to providing a detailed history of the
development of the Social Security program. Although many other
histories of Social Security have been written,' this history is
worth reading. First, though perhaps not most importantly, it is
fun and interesting to read. Altman does not simply dryly describe
the facts. Rather, she makes the history come alive. She paints
colorful pictures of the individuals who helped create Social
Security. For example, she describes John R. Commons, the
"grandfather of Social Security" as a "brilliant, creative scholar
with a self-deprecating sense of humor and a warmth of manner.
5. For a more critical overview of the Social Security system, see, for
example, DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
(2000). For one of the first books to call for the fundamentally restructuring of
Social Security and the creation of personal accounts, see PETER J. FERRARA,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION (1980).
6. In addition, Medicare is part of the Social Security program. For a
discussion of the early history and enactment of Medicare, see ALTMAN, supra
note 2, at 191-206.

7. Id. at 3.
8. For a recent history, see DANIEL BtLAND, SOCIAL SECURITY: HISTORY
AND POLITICS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE (2005).

Older, but outstanding, historical treatments of Social Security include
MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1979), ARTHUR J.
ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966), and EDWIN E.
WiITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: A MEMORANDUM ON
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY AND DRAFTING AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1963).
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Rumpled in appearance, serious in expression, and intellectual
though he was . . . ."9 In addition, she offers many interesting
anecdotes." For example, of particular interest to lawyers, she
describes the intrigue behind the structuring of the Social Security
system to withstand a constitutional attack. When Social Security
was originally enacted in 1935, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Commerce Clause much more narrowly than it does today, and
there was some question as to whether Social Security could
withstand a constitutional challenge.1 In the months before the
formation of the Committee on Economic Security ("CES"), the
group that President Franklin Roosevelt charged with drafting the
original Social Security bill, two Supreme Court Justices hinted to
individuals close to the Administration that the Social Security
program could withstand a constitutional challenge if it was based
on the federal government's taxing power. Justice Louis Brandeis
pointedly asked his son-in-law, the author of Wisconsin's
unemployment legislation and close associate of Assistant
Secretary of Labor Arthur Altmeyer, if he was familiar with
Florida v. Mellon,2 a federal estate tax case, and suggested that he

9. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 9. The following passage provides further
illustration of Altman's compelling descriptions of the important players in
Social Security's early history:
One outstanding leader in the creation and development of Social
Security is Arthur Altmeyer, a serious, bespectacled, scholarly man
called "Mr. Social Security" by President Roosevelt. Another is the
gregarious, energetic Wilbur Cohen, about whom Senator Douglas
quipped, "... an expert on Social Security is a person who knows Wilbur
Cohen's telephone number.' One more invaluable hero is the dignified
and personable Robert M. Ball, who the late Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan said was "as wise a counselor as any Senator will know." Still
another is Robert J. Myers, a tall, shy, soft-spoken actuary, whom
Moynihan labeled "a national treasure."
Id. at 5-6.
10. Some of the anecdotes are merely amusing. For example, Altman
describes how in January 1983 Robert Ball snuck out of his home to avoid the
press and attend a clandestine meeting of the National Commission on Social
Security Reform:
In desperation, Ball called Darman [an assistant to President Reagan].
Behind Ball's house was an extremely steep slope, covered in snow,
which led through a thickly wooded area to the George Washington
Darman dispatched a
Parkway, a major high-speed thoroughfare.
White House car while the 68-year-old Ball darted out the back door and
gingerly sidestepped down the slope to the waiting car. The press
missed the out-the-back-Jack escape.
ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 247.
11. On May 24, 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Social
Security Act against a constitutional challenge in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937). Altman describes President Roosevelt's court packing threat and
the role it may, or may not, have had in the Court's decision to upheld the
Social Security Act. See ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 116-25.
12. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
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read it if he was not. At a tea at his home, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone whispered to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, chair of
the CES, "The taxing power of the Federal Government, my dear;
the taxing power is sufficient for everything you need and want." 3
Altman's colorful descriptions and anecdotes do more than
simply make the book entertaining to read. They effectively
illustrate the need for the current Social Security system's
provision of social insurance. Social insurance is designed "to
prevent hardship, poverty, or dependence that might be caused by
the contingencies covered wherever and whenever these might
occur among workers able to join their employers and the
government in a national program."" It involves the "pooling of
resources and risk among equals.""
Altman describes the pre-Social Security world as one in
"[which] hardworking Americans who lost their wages through no
fault of their own [could] be forced into poverty and reliance on
charity."16 Altman continues:
It was not just the sky that was dark and cold [on Roosevelt's
inauguration day, Saturday, March 4, 1933]. By the beginning of
1933, about 15 million Americans were unemployed - almost 40
percent of the workforce. Of these, between 1 and 2 million people
13. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 51.

More entertaining, though less

significant, Altman relays a related anecdote. Three members of the staff of
the CES felt strongly that the old age program should be national in scope. Id.
at 46. One staff member of the CES, the CES' general counsel Thomas Eliot,
objected and claimed that a purely federal program would be unconstitutional.
Id. at 47. Prepared for this argument, Barbara Armstrong, a Berkeley law
professor, responded with briefs from two constitutional law scholars, Berkely
law professor Dudley 0. McGowveny and Duke law professor Douglas B.
Maggs, arguing that a unitary federal approach could withstand judicial
scrutiny. Id. Thomas Eliot dismissed the briefs and asserted that Harvard
law professor Thomas Reed Powell, "the dean of Constitutional law men in
American law schools," said a unitary federal approach was unconstitutional.
Id. Armstrong, unbeknownst to Eliot, was Reed's personal friend. Id. at 48.
She traveled to Boston to ask him whether he had ever opined that a unitary
approach was unconstitutional. He assured her that he had not and gave her
a letter stating:
Dear Tom:
Somewhere you picked up the impression that I believed that it would
be unconstitutional to have a compulsory old age insurance system in
this country. Of course, until the Supreme Court has a specific law and
passes upon, no one can be sure of this. But to the extent that I am
supposed to be a constitutional law authority, I say of course we can
have it.
Sincerely yours,
Thomas Reed Powell
P.S. I have no doubts whatsoever.
Id.
14. J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 57-58 (1977).

15. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 32.
16. Id. at 15.
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were traipsing the country in vain, looking for any kind of work.
Hundreds of thousands of others who had lost homes and savings
were camped just outside of Washington, in New York's Central
Park, and in and around other cities, in shacks, tents, and
cardboard boxes - shantytowns angrily nicknamed "Hoovervilles."
Millions more were underemployed, working just two or three
days a week, one or two weeks a month. Even those still employed
full time saw their earnings cut by a third. People were hungry for
any kind of work, no matter how little it paid. When New York
advertised for 100 men to shovel snow for 50 cents an hour, 1,000
men lined up at the employment office at dawn, some dressed in
expensive overcoats and homburg hats. A mother of six picketed in
protest at being excluded, on account of her sex, from the temporary
snow-shoveling job. 17
Altman illuminates the fundamental difference between
social insurance and welfare: "Welfare programs are designed for
people who are already poor. Social insurance prevents workers
from becoming poor in the first place."'8 By limiting benefits to
individuals who are poor, welfare discourages work and savings.
In contrast, wage-related social insurance, like the current Social
Security system, encourages work and savings by providing larger
benefits for larger wages and by providing a floor of protection
upon which workers can add savings. 9
Social insurance is also fundamentally different from
President Bush's proposed reform of the Social Security system.

17. Id. at 21-22.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 33. Altman's discussion of the Clark amendment illustrates how
Social Security encourages savings.
According to Altman, the Clark
Amendment was the most bitterly debated issue in the final weeks leading up
to the enactment of the Social Security. Id. at 77. This amendment,
spearheaded by Walter Forster, a man who made his living drafting and
selling pensions, would have permitted employers that offered private
pensions to opt out of Social Security. Id. Ultimately, a compromise was
reached pursuant to which the Social Security bill was reported out of
conference without the Clark amendment in exchange for the appointment of
a special joint committee to study the issue and develop a proposal that would
be satisfactory to both the House and Senate. Id. at 79. The following year,
however, interest in the Clark Amendment waned. Id. at 95-96. Walter
Forster and the other insurance brokers who had championed the amendment
abandoned it because, rather than ruining their business, the passage of
Social Security had led to the brokers selling more retirement plans than ever
before. Id. at 96. As Altman describes:
Prior to the enactment of Social Security, most people saw retirement on
an adequate income as an impossible goal. With the promise of Social
Security, it became a realistic goal. At the same time, most people saw
that the promised benefits were inadequate, if they wanted to maintain
their standards of living in retirement. Consequently, they began to
think about methods to supplement the promise.
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His reform is part of his vision of an "ownership society"" in which
individuals "[o]wn their own home, own their own business, own
their own health care plan, [and] own a piece of their own
retirement."2 ' This reform, which "trust[s] the people" 2 and "say[s]
that the government must stand on the side of people,"" is the
very antithesis of social insurance. Social insurance embodies
solidarity and collective action 4 through the "pooling of resources
and risks among equals.""
The "ownership society" eschews
collective action and idealizes individual responsibility and
individual risk.
Although other critiques of private accounts have been
written, Altman's critique is particularly interesting in that it
places the proposed reform in historical and political context. For
example, Altman begins her discussion of private accounts by
discussing a 1983 article entitled "Achieving a 'Leninist' Strategy"
in which two of the early proponents of individual accounts
described themselves as revolutionaries and plotted the overthrow
of Social Security. 7 These early individual account proponents
urged their fellow revolutionaries to "be prepared for a long
campaign" and to use "guerilla warfare against both the current
Social Security system and the coalition that supports it" to
achieve this reform." She then describes how President Bush
more or less followed this strategy in his unsuccessful bid to
reform the system in 2005.

20. The Cato Institute has been credited with coining the phrase
"ownership society." See Kathleen Coles, The Dilema of the Remote Tippee, 41
GONZ. L. REV. 181, 182 n.7 (2005-2006).
21. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2004)
(quoting President Bush in a 2004 campaign advertisement).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Kathryn L. Moore, President Bush's Personal Retirement Accounts:
Saving or DismantlingSocial Security? 2005 N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS &
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5-1, 5-23 & nn. 109-11.
25. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 32.
26. For example, see the following critiques written by this author, Moore,
supra note 24; Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security:
Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo.
L. REV. 341 (2000); Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially
Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969 (1998); Kathryn L.
Moore, Privatizationof Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
131 (1998).
27. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 255 (citing Stuart Butler & Peter Gemanis,
Achieving Social Security Reform: A "Leninist"Strategy, 3 CATO J. 547, 556
(1983)).
28. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Stuart Butler & Peter Gemanis, Achieving Social
Security Reform: A "Leninist"Strategy, 3 CATO J. 547, 552-556 (1983)).
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Altman's book concludes by endorsing Robert Ball's three-part
plan to bring Social Security into close actuarial balance.29 The
first part of the Ball/Altman plan consists of dedicating the estate
tax to funding Social Security beginning in 2010." Under the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA"), 31 the estate tax exemption is scheduled to gradually
increase from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million (or $7 million for a
couple) in 2009, and be abolished in 2010.2 Under EGTRRA's
sunset clause, however, the entire Act will expire in 201 1,33 and
the estate tax will be revived at its 2000 levels beginning in 2011.
Ball and Altman propose freezing the estate tax at the 2009 level
and earmarking the proceeds for Social Security beginning in
2010." 4 According to estimates by Social Security actuaries,
earmarking the estate tax would reduce Social Security's longterm debt by about 0.5 percent of payroll. 3
The second part of the Ball/Altman plan consists of gradually
increasing the maximum taxable wage base until it reaches ninety
percent of earnings. 6 Under current law, both employees37 and
employers 8 are required to pay a tax of 6.2 percent of wages, up to
a maximum taxable wage base,39 indexed to the increase in
average wages nationwide and equal to $97,500 in 2007, 40 to
finance Social Security benefits."' The maximum taxable wage
base also serves as a benefits base, which establishes the
maximum amount of earnings that are used to calculate benefits. 2
In 2004, just under eighty-five percent of all earnings were subject
to the tax,' and the share of earnings subject to the tax is expected
29. Close actuarial balance is defined as "income... within plus-or-minus 5
percent of outgo over the next 75 years." ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 297.
30. Id. at 299-301.
31. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
32. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521, 115 Stat. 38, 69-72 (2001).
33. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(b), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001).
34. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 299-301.
35. Id. at 301; see also Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary
to Robert M. Ball, Estimated OASDI Financial Effects for a Proposal With Six
Provisions That Would Improve Social Security Financing - Information 2
(April 14, 2005), available at http://www.ssa.gove/OACT/solvency/RB20050414.html (indicating that this provision would reduce the long range
deficit by .51% of taxable payroll).
36. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 301-03.
37. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (2000).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (2000).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 430(a) (2000).
40. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 62636
(Oct. 26, 2006) (announcing the cost of living increase and other
determinations for the 2007 taxable wage base).
41. The self-employed are required to pay similar taxes. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a) (2000).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2000).
43. Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security
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to further decrease to eighty-three percent of all earnings by 2015
and remain stable thereafter."
In 1977, Congress amended Social Security to increase the
maximum taxable wage base in four steps that were designed to
ensure that the taxable wage base would cover ninety percent of
all wages by 1982. 4" In addition, it was expected that Social
Security's indexing provisions would ensure that "the proportion of
total payroll covered by the base [would] be eliminated at a
constant level over the long run."' Due in large part to the fact
that salaries for top earners have grown faster than for average
earners,47 the share of earnings subject to the tax decreased to
eighty-five percent of all earnings by 2004 and is expected to
further decrease to eighty-three percent of all earnings by 2015.4
Ball and Altman propose that the maximum taxable wage
base be increased by two percent each year (in addition to the
currently scheduled automatic increases due to the growth in
average wages) until the base reaches the ninety percent standard
set in 1977. 49 Under this approach, it would take about forty years
to reach the ninety percent level." According to estimates by
Social Security actuaries, this proposed increase in the taxable
wage base would reduce Social Security's projected shortfall by
0.61 percent of the taxable payroll.5
The final element of the three-part Ball/Altman proposal
consists of investing a portion of the Social Security surplus in
equities. 2 Under current law, any surplus in the Social Security
Trust Fund must be invested in United States government bonds.5
Ball and Altman propose that the law be amended to permit up to
twenty percent of the surplus to be invested in a broadly
diversified, indexed equity fund or funds.
Specifically, they
propose that the investment be implemented gradually: one

Bulletin, 2005, Table 4.B1, at 4.12-4.13 (2006).
44. See DEBRA WHITMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE
TAXABLE EARNINGS BASE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 8(May 2, 2005).
45. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 103, 91
Stat. 1513 (1977) (increasing the base to $17,700 in 1978, $22,900 in 1979,
$25,900 in 1980, and $29,700 in 1981).
46. H.R. REP. No. 95-702, pt. 1, at 18 (1977), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4155, 4175.
47. Virginia P. Reno & Joni Lavery, Options to Balance Social Security
Funds Over the Next 75 Years, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE,
Feb. 2005, Brief 18, at 4.
48. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 8.
49. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 302.

50. Id. at 302.
51. Id. at 303; Goss, supra note 35.
52. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 303-04.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2000) ("Such investments may be made only in
interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed

as to both principal and interest by the United States.").
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percent of assets at the end of 2006, two percent of assets at the
end of 2007, and increasing by one percent each year until twenty
percent of assets are invested in equities at the end of 2025. They
propose a separate limitation on total trust fund investments
equal to fifteen percent of the total market value of all stocks.
According to estimates by Social Security actuaries, the proposed
diversity of investments would reduce Social Security's projected
deficit by 0.37 percent of taxable payroll."
As I have discussed at length elsewhere," I believe the
Although
Ball/Altman proposal merits serious consideration.
proposal as "pain-free (for almost
Altman describes the
everyone),"' the proposal is not entirely costless. Perhaps, and
most significantly, it would impose costs on the six percent or so of
workers who would be required to pay higher payroll taxes. In
addition, investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in
Security's
necessarily
increase
Social
equities
would
administrative costs.
The current Social Security system is
administered in an extremely efficient manner, with total
administrative expenses equal to about one percent of total
expenditures.57 Undoubtedly, the administrative cost of investing
in private equities would be higher than the administrative cost of
investing in United States government bonds. How much higher,
however, is not entirely clear.
Nevertheless, the Ball/Altman proposal should not be rejected
because it would impose some costs. There is no costless solution
And the Ball/Altman
to Social Security's long-term deficit.
proposal is well worth considering because it would address Social
Security's long-term deficit without fundamentally restructuring
the system.

54. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 303. Cf. Goss, supra note 35, at 1-2 (noting
that all three elements of Ball/Altman proposal would reduce the deficit by
1.47 percent and attributing 0.61 percent reduction to increasing taxable wage
base and 0.51 percent reduction to federal estate tax provision).
55. See Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental
Restructuring or Incremental Change, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341
(forthcoming 2007); Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security: An Analysis of the
Ball/Altman Three-Point Plan, 2007 N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (forthcoming).
56. ALTMAN, supra note 2, at 297.
57. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE

AND DISABILITY INSURANCE

TRUST

FUNDS 4 (2006). If administrative expenses for the disability program are
excluded, administrative expenses fall to about 0.6 percent of expenditures.

